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SUCCESSOR LANDLORDS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
EXTENT OF A SUCCESSOR LANDLORD'S
LIABILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS
TO RESIDENTIAL TENANTS IN ONTARIO
PAUL STUART RAPSEY*
RESUMlt
Ce commentaire de cas porte sur une decision r6cente de la Cour divisionnaire
de l'Ontario. I] soulve une question de competence qui a longtemps fait l'objet
de propositions de rdforme du droit par les ddfenseurs des locataires. On y traite
de l'6tendue des pouvoirs du registraire local (1) 6mettre des ordonnances ou
A statuer sur des questions en vertu de la quatri~me partie de la Loi sur la location
immobili~re lorsqu'un locataire se pr~sente pour contester une requate d'un
propri~taire et (2) de condamner aux d6pens un locataire ou tout locataire qui
ne se pr6sente pas une comparution. La Cour divisionnaire a maintenu que le
registraire n'a pas une telle compdtence mais que de telles ordonnances ne sont
pas nulles ab initio. L'auteur sugg~re que de telles ordonnances devraient 6tre
d6clar6es nulles, non seulement 6vitables, et que toute autre conclusion jette le
discr6dit sur l'administration de la justice.
INTRODUCTION
Landlords are in the business of renting property. This is true whether the
premises in question are residential or commercial. When landlords are the
owners of the property they naturally wish the best return for their investment.
Property passes from one owner to the next for a variety of reasons. This paper
addresses issues relating to successor landlords in the context of residential
The author graduated from the University of Toronto Law School in 1985. He is cur-
rently a research lawyer for the Ontario Legal Aid Plan, Clinic Resource Office (To-
ronto). In 1987-8 he was a law clerk for the Ontario Supreme Court. From 1988 he has
worked as a lawyer both in private practice and for the Ontario Legal Aid clinic system.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author in his personal capacity.
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
tenancies governed by Part IV of the Landlord and Tenant Act1 (hereinafter the
LTA) in Ontario.
Frequently, residential tenants have paid security deposits to the original
owner/landlord. 2 Many purchasers will satisfy themselves as to the existence of
security deposits and the obligations with respect to interest owing to tenants.
The parties to the sale will account for this at closing.
However, many purchasers of residential property do not do this. On closing,
the new owner may not be credited for the deposit retained by the vendor-land-
lord. Residential tenants find themselves being refused interest payments on
deposits which they had paid to previous owners or landlords by successor
landlords. They are told to sue their original landlord who has long since
disappeared or, not infrequently, gone bankrupt. Moreover, when they move out,
the successor landlord will demand that the tenant pay rent a second time for
the last month of the tenancy. They will not credit the tenant for the rent deposit
for the last month's rent paid to the previous landlord.
Similar issues arise with respect to the liability of successor landlords for
disrepair of rental premises which has arisen under previous ownership. Pur-
chasers will usually acquire a building for a market price which corresponds
directly or indirectly with the depreciated value of the building in combination
with the current real estate and income earning value of the property. Disrepair
of the premises is one item that is factored into the price.
This paper primarily addresses the issue of a successor landlord's liability to
account for pre-paid rent which a tenant has paid to a previous landlord. I
apply the same analysis to the separate issue of a successor landlord's
obligation to account for any abatement of rent which has accrued under a
previous owner.
THE LEGISLATION
I suggest that two of the principle intentions of the LTA reforms which intro-
duced Part IV into the scheme of landlord and tenant law were a concern over
archaic laws and legal principles pertaining to 1) repairs and maintenance and
2) security deposits. When considering the liabilities of successors in title, one
1. R.S.O. 1990, c. L-7 [hereinafter the LTA].
2. While it is not a mandatory requirement that residential tenant pay a security deposit, a
landlord of residential premises is permitted to request a security deposit for the last
month's rent: LTA, s.82. The security deposit may only be in the amount of one
month's rent and it is an offence for the landlord to charge a greater amount as a de-
posit: LTA, s.122. The landlord must pay annually 6% interest on the deposit.
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must keep these remedial goals in mind. 3 Unfortunately, the courts will too often
fall back on ancient doctrines of land law that no longer have a place in our
society without regard to the significant reforms in the past thirty-five years and
without regard to the reasons for that reform. 4
Two definitions are important for the purpose of this paper. Section I of the LTA
defines "landlord ' 5 for the purpose of the LTA and section 79 defines the term
"security deposit" for the purpose of Part IV of the LTA. 6
The remedial nature of the LTA has been accepted by the courts in numerous
decisions. For example, in Re Baker and Hayward,7 Wilson J.A. held that "one
of the reasons for the revision of the Act in 1969 was to rectify the imbalance
deemed to exist in favour of landlords". 8 She held that the language of the statute
would have to be very clear and unambiguous to effect a hardship upon a tenant.9
3. In D.H.L. Lamont, Residential Tenancies, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1978), the author
acknowledges that the landlord and tenant law amendments (Part IV) which came into
force on January 1, 1970 "were quite revolutionary." (at 2). This is readily apparent
from a review of three successive reports of the Ontario Law Reform Commission
[hereinafter the OLRC]. The first report was the Interim Report of the Ontario Law Re-
form Commission on Landlord and Tenant Law Applicable to Residential Tenancies,
(Toronto: Dept. of the Attorney General, 1968) [hereinafter the Interim Report]. The
OLRC issued the Interim Report "[iun view of the urgency of the problems respecting
residential tenancies...". (at 5). The Interim Report addressed matters that needed im-
mediate redress pending further study and review. One of the issues addressed was se-
curity deposits. The central issue of concern was the issue of maintenance and repairs.
4. For example, Finlayson J.A., in what can only be described as a contemptuous tone, de-
scribed Part IV of the LTA as a "paternalistic statute": McBride v. Comfort Living
Housing Co-operative Inc. (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 394 (C.A.). Fortunately, Justice
Finlayson's view is not shared by other judges of the Court of Appeal. Recently, we
have seen several very enlightened decisions concerning Part IV of the LTA: e.g. Re
Rent Review Hearings Board and Prajs (1993), 16 O.R. (3d) 97 (C.A.)
5. LTA, s. 1: "landlord" includes a person who is lessor, owner, the person giving or per-
mitting the occupation of the premises in question, and these persons' heirs and assigns
and legal representatives...
6. LTA, s. 79: "security deposit" means money or any property right paid or given by a
tenant of residential premises to a landlord or the landlord's agent or to anyone on the
landlord's behalf to be held by or for the account of the landlord as security for the per-
formance of an obligation or the payment of a liability of the tenant or to be returned to
the tenant upon the happening of a condition;
7. (1977), 16 OR. (2d) 695 (C.A.).
8. Ibid. at 699.
9. Ibid., Op. cit., at 701. See also: Re Kasprzycki and Abel (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 536 (Dist.
Ct.) in which the court held that the LTA was "in large measure, created for the protec-
tion of tenants." (at 542).
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More particularly, in Re Boyd and Earl & Jennie Lohn Ltd.,10 the court dealt
specifically with the issue of security deposits. 11 Referring to the definition of
"security deposit" in what is now s.79, Potts J. stated: 12
This section first appeared in the Act through 1968-69 (Ont.), c. 58, s. 3, as
part of the entire remedial package introducing Part IV-the residential ten-
ancies provisions in the Act....
[The definition of "security deposit" in. s.79] was the end product of the On-
tario Law Reform Commission's efforts. As a definition section it is far-
reaching and all-embracing, taking into consideration obligations and
liabilities which a tenant may owe to his landlord...
Justice Potts held that the trial judge had erred by reading the reference to
security deposits for last month's rent in what is now s.82 as limiting the very
broad definition of "security deposit" in what is now s.79. Potts J. addressed the
interpretation of Part IV of the LTA. 13 He stated:
The present sections dealing with security deposits were part of the reme-
dial package. The only security deposit that is allowed is one month's rent,
on which the landlord must pay interest....
... In my view, [s.82] was enacted to prevent undue hardship to those ten-
ants who required housing accommodation but could not afford to come
forward with large amounts of money in advance. At the same time it pro-
vides landlords with a specific sum as security against unpaid rent....
Accordingly, the provisions in the Act should be interpreted broadly and
given the construction which gives effect to the governing intentions or ob-
jects of the Act as described above....
... In [s.82(1)], the security is an advance payment of the last month's rent.
It is not collateral given to ensure the later payment of that debt, nor is it re-
turned to the tenant as the usual forms of collateral would be.... 14
10. (1984),47 O.R. (2d) 111 (H.C.J.) [hereinafterRe Boyd].
11. At issue was whether the requirement of eight pro-rated cheques for the balance of one
year's rent was an attempt to contract out of the security deposit provisions of the LTA.
12. Supra, op. cit., note 7 at 115.
13. Re Boya4 supra, note 1Oat 122-4.
14. The opposite result was reached in Re Veltrusy Enterprises and Gallant (1980), 28 O.R.
(2d) 349 (Co. Ct.) [hereinafter Re Veltrusy]. The facts were very similar. The decision
in Re Veltrusy was set aside on appeal to the Court of Appeal for different reasons, Re
Gallant and Veltrusy Enterprises (1981), 32 O.R. (2d) 716 (C.A.). It seems that both
cases were applications for a declaration under the rules. The Court of Appeal had held
that the County Court had no jurisdiction under the old rules to hear an application to
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The Ontario Law Reform Commission's Interim Report15 (hereinafter OLRC
Interim Report) found that security deposits requested by landlords were the
second most serious cause of tenant concern. 16 Deposits were a feature of many
leasing arrangements and usually coincided with a shortage of rental accommo-
dation. Deposits were justified by landlords to secure their investment in the
property against damage by tenants. 17
Tenants were concerned about the financial burden of having to outlay monies
at the commencement of the rental term. They felt interest on any deposit paid
to the landlord should be payable by the landlord. The OLRC reported that "[b]y
far the most serious complaint, however, relates to the difficulties encountered
in obtaining repayment of the deposit on the termination of the tenancy". 18
The OLRC specifically addressed itself to the issue of successor landlords and
overcoming the effect of the then recent decision of the Ontario High Court in
Re Dollar Land Corporation Ltd. and Soloman.19 The OLRC felt it should be
incumbent on a successor landlord to satisfy itself on closing as to the state of
deposits.20 As a result of the OLRC Interim Report, what is now s.82 of the LTA
was enacted.
2 1
determine the rights of the parties under a tenancy agreement. In any event, the more
thorough and the more enlightened decision is that of the High Court in Re Boyd, supra,
note 11. The County Court Judge in Re Veltrusy seemed to think the very broad defini-
tion of "security deposit" in what is now s.79 was limited in all respects by what is now
s.82 to "deposits for last month's rent". The Re Veltrusy decision did not consider the
extensive legislative history.
15. Interim Report, supra., note 3.
16. The first was repairs.
17. Interim Report., supra, note 3 at 21.
18. Ibid. at 22.
19. [1963] 2 O.R. 269 (H.C.J.) [hereinafter Re Dollar]. In this decision, the court held that a
tenant who had pre-paid rent to the previous owner, was liable to pay that rent a second
time to the new landlord. The tenant's remedy was to sue the former landlord. We dis-
cuss this case below.
20. The OLRC was recommending a trust account system for deposits. The specific recom-
mendation in this report did not mention trust accounts. It did make it clear that deposits
were to be treated as security for rent only.
21. LTA, s.84(1)
A landlord shall not require or receive a security deposit from a tenant under a tenancy
agreement entered into or renewed on or after the 1st day of January, 1970 other than
for a rent period not exceeding one month, which payment shall be applied in payment
of rent for the last rent period under the tenancy agreement. S.O. 1968-69; now R.S.O.
1990, c. L-7, s. 82.
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In 1972, a second report of the OLRC reviewed the amendments which had then
been in place for two years. 22 It considered complaints by landlords concerning
the outlawing of damage deposits. It concluded that they were "... not persuaded
that a case has been made for a restoration of former practices and the abuses
attendant upon them."
23
In 1976, a third OLRC report24 found that the problems of security deposits for
residential tenancies had been adequately addressed. It did not recommend the
regulating of security deposits for commercial tenancies. It determined that commer-
cial tenants were better able to protect their interests than were residential tenants.
25
What is now subsection 82(1) was again modified in June 1987.26 This was




In order to fully comprehend the scope of a successor landlords liability it is
critical to understand something about the law of covenants and how this law
has been dramatically amended with respect to residential tenancies in Ontario.
This is an archaic area of the law. It is often incomprehensible. At common law,
depending on the nature of the covenant a successor landlord may or may not
be bound. The OLRC dealt with this issue most extensively in its third report
22. OLRC, Report on Review of Part IV, The Landlord and Tenant Act, (Toronto: Dept. of
Justice, 1972).
23. Interim Report, supra., note 3 at 16. The OLRC did recommend that the wording of the
section be changed. The phrase "for the last period under the tenancy agreement" ap-
peared to restrict the application of the rent deposit to the period when the lease would
normally terminate. It did not address the situation where the tenancy is terminated pre-
maturely but validly. Accordingly, the OLRC recommended that the section be
amended to make it clear that the deposit could be applied to the last rent period im-
mediately preceding the termination of the tenancy. (at 17). It also felt that a system for
re ulating the deposits would be administratively cumbersome. The section was
amended by S.O. 1972, c. 123. The phrase "under the tenancy agreement" was replaced
by "immediately preceding the termination of the tenancy".
24. OLRC, Report on Landlord and Tenant Law, (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney Gen-
eral, 1976).
25. Ibid. at 207.
26. S.O. 1987, c. 23.
27. The amendment relating to deposits provides that the deposit cannot exceed the amount
of rent for one rent period and in any event not more than the amount of one month's
rent. Before this the section permitted the taking of a deposit up to the amount of one
month's rent even when the rental period was less than one month.
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dealing with the LTA. 28 It found that the rules concerning covenants were
"purely arbitrary, and ... quite illogical...".
The OLRC had dealt with the issue of covenants in the previous two reports as
well. In the first report,29 the OLRC noted that very few covenants are implied
in favour of tenants. In particular, the OLRC examined the independence of lease
covenants. In the first report, the OLRC reported that: "...[c]oncepts rooted in an
agricultural economy of a by-gone day provide little logical relevancy for today's
landlord and tenant realities." 30 Since the common-law in combination with the
existing statute law resulted in an imbalance of rights in favour of landlord's, 3 1 the
OLRC recommended that covenants in leases be made dependent on each other
rather than independent of each other as there were at common law.
32
The OLRC also dealt with the issue of covenant's binding successors in title. It
recommended that the anachronistic distinction between covenants in esse and
covenants in posse be abolished for residential tenancies. 33 In response to these
recommendations, the Legislature enacted what are now s.87 and s.88 of the LTA.
3 4
If, as Re Boyd and Earl & Jennie Lohn Ltd.35 suggests, the security deposit is
prepayment of rent and not a collateral agreement, then an agreement to pay a
security deposit must be a covenant that runs with the land. 36
28. Supra, note 24, commencing at 21. The third report dealt primarily with non-residential
tenancies.
29. Interim Report, supra., note 3.
30. Ibid. at 56.
31. Ibid. at 57.
32. Ibid. at 58. This was done by what is now s.87 of the LTA. Covenants in residential ten-
ancy agreements are now "interdependent".
33. Ibid. at 59. The OLRC reported:
"One of the ancient rules, as enunciated in Spencer's Case, (1583). 5 Co. Rep. 16a,
which has remained part of the law of landlord and tenant is that an express covenant
which touches and concerns the subject matter of the lease runs with the land and is
binding on successors in title whether or not these "assignees" are named, so long as the
covenant refers to something already in existence (in esse). An example is a covenant to
repair an existing wall. Where, however, the covenant refers to something not in exis-
tence (in posse) at the time of the lease, the covenant does not bind the assignees unless
the original lessee covenanted for himself and his assignees.
.. [This anachronism should be done away with by appropriate legislation. thus
covenant 'in posse' should be treated in the same way as covenents 'in esse'."
34. S.O. 1968-69, c. 58.
35. Supra, note 10.
36. In Bullock v. Key Property Management Inc., [1992) O.J. No. 1136 (O.C.J.) [unre-
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
In Active Builders Ltd. v. Royal Trust Corp. of Canada and Bulawsky,3 7 the
Court of Queen's Bench, on an appeal from the Rentalsman, held that a security
deposit was a covenant which ran with the land. Therefore, in that case, the
purchaser under a power of sale was required to account for a. security deposit
paid to a previous owner. However, the Manitoba legislation expressly states:
Covenants concerning things relating to the rented premises, including cov-
enants relating to the payment by the tenant of a security deposit and refund
thereof by the landlord, run with the land whether or not the things are in
existence at the time of the demise.
The provision is comparable to s.88 of the LTA with the noted exception that
security deposits are expressly referred to. We suggest that this was out of an
abundance of caution. This is supported by a recent Ontario decision in Re
Spencer Properties Ltd. and Zrebiec.
38
RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES ACT
The third OLRC report, (1976), was the catalyst for further reform, although the
OLRC felt that many of the problems for residential tenants with respect to
ported], the Court also agreed that a security deposit once paid was rent. If security de-
posits are rent, then on the plain reading of s.62 of the LTA, above, a tenant is not liable
to any subsequent grantee of the reversion for any rent paid prior to notice of the grant.
Section 62 is in Part III of the LTA. Parts I to III of the LTA apply to residential tenan-
cies except to the extent that they are inconsistent with Part IV of the LTA: s.2. This
issue applies to mortgagee situations. Section 62 states:
(I) Every grant or conveyance of any rent or of the reversion or remainder of any land
is good and effectual without any attomment of the tenant of the land out of which such
rent issues, or of the particular tenant upon whose particular tenant any such reversion
or remainder is expectant or depending.
(2) A tenant should not be prejudiced or damaged by the payment of rent to any grantor
or by breach of any condition for non-payment of rent before notice to the tenant of
such grant by the grantee.
One would think this on its own should end the argument. Unfortunately, it does not
appear that the courts in any of the earlier decision were referred to this section of the
Act or the above decisions pertaining to security deposits as rent.
37. (1993), 90 Man. R. (2d) 280 (Q.B.).
38. [1993] O.J. No. 2944 (O.C.J.) [unreported] [hereinafter Re Spencer Properties]. The
court held that s.82(l) creates an implied covenant. The case involved the sale of the
premises under power of sale by a mortgagee to a purchaser for value. The court held
that pursuant to s.88, covenants pertaining to the premises run with the land. This in-
cluded the payment of a security deposit. The mortgagee was an assignee of the rever-
sion and bound by that covenant. Similarly, the present landlord, as purchaser, was also
the assignee of the reversion and bound by that covenant.
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successor landlord obligations had been remedied. 39 This further report ulti-
mately led to the enactment of the Residential Tenancies Act, (hereinafter the
RTA). 40 This legislation would have replaced Part IV of the LTA and the existing
legislation pertaining to rent review 41 with a much more comprehensive law.
The part which was to have replaced Part IV of the LTA was never proclaimed
into force.
42
An examination of this legislation with respect to the treatment of security
deposits and the position of assignees is useful.
Section 9 dealt with security deposits. It did not substantially change the LTA
provision. 4 3 However, s. 14 and s. 15 addressed the effect of a change of landlord
and the assignment of the tenancy. Section 14 stated:
39. The third report concluded that the running of covenants and the position of assignees
needed to be addressed. The specific recommendation dealt with residential and non-
residential tenancies. With some exceptions, the OLRC concluded that "... the assignee
of the beneficial interests of a landlord or a tenant should, automatically upon the as-
signment, have all the benefits and be subject to all the obligations, of the landlord or
the tenant ... as are implied by law or expressed in the tenancy agreement, in the same
manner as if he were the original landlord." (at 28). The exceptions referred to by the
OLRC permitted some contracting out in non-residential tenancies. However the OLRC
was express in stating that it "would not, however, be possible to avoid any mandatory
obligations imposed for example under Part IV of LTA by providing that such obliga-
tions would not run in favour of, or against, assignees." (at 32). The OLRC determined
the need to be rid of the uncertainties inherent in the requirement that covenants have
reference to the subject matter of the tenancy agreement or "touch and concern" the
land. (at 29). The OLRC acknowledged that some problems pertaining to covenants had
already been remedied for residential tenancies by the enacting of what is now s.88 of
the LTA. (at 31).
40. S.O. 1979, c.78 [hereinafter the RTA].
41. The Residential Premises Rent Review Act S.O. 1975, c. 12.
42. Supra, note 40. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in Reference Re
Residential Tenancies Act, 1979, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 714, that certain powers given to the
new Residential Tenancies Commission usurped the powers of the federally appointed
judges pursuant to s.96 of the British North America Act [now the Constitution Act,
1867]. The Court concluded that it was not within the legislative authority of Ontario to
give the Commission the power to make eviction orders or compliance orders. As such,
the legislation was invalid in that limited respect.
43. It did make it clear that a rent deposit could only be required at the commencement of
the tenancy. This seems self-evident as has been clarified by the caselaw: McKelvie v.
Luchi (1983), 1 T.L.L.R. 108 (Ont. Dist. Ct.). See also: Re 673078 Ontario Limited and
Mandowsky (29 July 1987), #211/87 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) in which the Court held that the
new owner could not require a security deposit where none had been required under the
original tenancy agreement. While the parties may contract for the payment of such a
deposit, to require it at a later date without the consent of the tenant would be an at-
tempt to unilaterally change the terms of the agreement. This would be repugnant to a
basic principle of contract law that a contract is a mutual agreement entered into freely
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
Where there has been a change of landlord, all benefits and obligations aris-
ing under this Act, and any additional benefits and obligations arising under
a written tenancy agreement, bind the new landlord.
Section 15 similarly addressed the benefits and obligations in situations where
there has been an assignment of the tenancy agreement by the tenant. Section
22 stated more particularly:
Where there has been a change of landlord,
(a) the new landlord is liable to a tenant for any breach of the landlord's
obligations under the tenancy agreement or this Act, where the
breach relates to the period after the change of landlord, whether or
not the breach began before the change of landlord;
(b) the former landlord is liable to a tenant for any breach of the
landlord's obligations under the tenancy agreement or this Act, where
the breach relates to a period before the change of landlord;
The RTA was in many ways not a new law, but rather a simplification and
clarification of existing law.44 The OLRC in the 1976 report had however hoped
to limit a successor landlord's liability in some instances. 45 This limitation
would have been a change in the existing law as amended by Part IV of the LTA.
by two or more competent parties. This is no less true of a variation of an existing con-
tract. A party may not alter the terms of the agreement by unilateral action.. One party
to a contract may not unilaterally alter the terms after the commencement of the agree-
ment. The RTA also provided that upon a lawful rent increase the amount of the deposit
could be increased accordingly. The rate of interest payable was increased from 6% to
9% annually.
44. This principle of interpretation has been recently acknowledged by the Divisional Court
in Re Feeney and Noble, [1994] O.J. No. 550 (O.C.J.) [unreported], aff'd (1994), 19
O.R. (3d) 762 (Div. Ct.) and is consistent with the Interpretation Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I-
11, as am., s.17 and s.18 [hereinafter IA].
45. The exceptions referred to by the OLRC permitted some contracting out in non-residen-
tial tenancies. However the OLRC was express in stating that it "would not, however,
be possible to avoid any mandatory obligations imposed for example under Part IV of
LTA by providing that such obligations would not run in favour of, or against, assign-
ees." (at 32). The OLRC further stated:
"Finally, it will be noted that the recommendations concerning the running of covenants
are intended to apply to the assignment of beneficial interests in a written tenancy
agreement. ... In the case of parol tenancy agreements only 'covenants' which are im-
plied by law, either at common law (such as a tenant's covenant to pay rent) or by stat-
ute (such as the landlord's covenant to repair residential premises) would be
enforceable by or against the assignees of the landlord or the tenant. To permit any
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USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
While the use of legislative history may be suspect with respect to the applica-
tion of a statute it may be relevant to a determination of the purpose of the
legislation.46
Legislative history has been examined in several landlord and tenant cases. 47
This would seem to be justified by virtue of s.120 of the LTA which permits a
more liberal use of evidence than in other proceedings. 48
The Supreme Court of Canada has also recently referred to Hansard in a
non-constitutional case: Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop. 4 9 The use of legislative
history in residential tenancy proceedings makes sense. The legislation is
generally accepted to be remedial. It was the subject of a massive and well-pub-
licized law reform study which had a direct correlation to the enactment of Part
IV of the LTA.
More recently, the Supreme Court of Canada has raised questions, without
deciding the issue, concerning the use of legislative debates in non-constitu-
tional proceedings: R. v. Heywood.50 It is clear that the Court was concerned
with "debates" in the legislature and not legislative history in its broadest sense.
The Court reaffirmed that such debates are admissible in the context of consti-
tutional cases and Charter cases. However the purpose for which they may be
used is not for the interpretation of the enactments themselves, at 108, but to
appreciate their constitutional validity.
5 1
other result would be to invite evidential problems of considerable magnitude." (at 30).
46. R. Dickerson, Interpretation and Application of Statutes (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
1975) at 141. The issue is discussed in more detail by P. A. C6t6, The Interpretation of
Legislation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Cowansville, Quebec: Les Editions Yvons Blais Inc.,
1991) at 353-4. C6t6 concludes that the rule excluding parliamentary history is being
totally abandoned. (at 361-7).
47. For example, Re Quann and Pajelle Investments Ltd. (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 769 (Co. Ct.),
one of the earlier, more thorough and more enlightened examinations of the scope of
the Part IV amendments; and more recently in Re Foster and Lewkowicz (1993), 14
O.R. (3d) 339 (O.C.J.).
48. This includes the admission of hearsay evidence and any relevant oral or documentary
evidence.
49. (1993), 149 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.). However, that case dealt with human rights legislation and
was therefore quasi-constitutional in scope.
50. (1995), 174 N.R. 81 (S.C.C.), at 107-9. This was a criminal proceeding. The Court was
concerned with the definition of the word "loiter" in the Criminal Code, s.179(l)(b).
The Attorney General wished to introduce legislative debates to argue that the term in-
cluded the concept of malevolent intent.
51. Nevertheless, the court states that "legislative history" (i.e., not simply "legislative de-
(1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy
The Supreme Court in R. v. Heywood52 specifies two reasons why legislative
debates are not a reliable source:
1. The intent of particular members of the legislature is not the same as
the corporate intent of the legislature.
2. The political nature of debates in the legislature brings into question
their reliability.
With respect to the first, that may be true of debates by general members.
However, statements by the sponsoring Minister upon the introduction of the
legislation are more reliable. Statements in Committee of the Whole concerning
a particular clause immediately before a vote may also be reliable as an indicator




Pre-paid rent and deposits
One would think that an examination of the statutory provisions themselves would
be sufficient to resolve this issue. That is not so. The case law on the issue under
consideration relies most often on old land law jurisprudence. It tends to ignore the
remedial approach to the legislation. It also tends to ignore the legislation itself.54
The first two cases cited below are decisions of the County Court and the High
Court respectively. They were both before the Part IV LTA amendments of 1970.
These and other old cases are often cited by courts which fail to consider the
period or circumstances in which these decisions were made or the impact of
the significant residential tenancy amendments to land law.
In Cavell v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale Ltd.,55 the Court stated that "rent paid ...
before it is due" is done at the tenant's risk in the case of change of ownership.
56
bates") may be used to demonstrate the mischief the legislature was intending to rem-
edy (at 107), i.e., it may be used to demonstrate the remedial purpose of the statute. It is
in this sense that legislative history is most often used in landlord and tenant proceed-
ings.
52. Supra, note 50 at 109.
53. The Supreme Court of Canada notes that the Supreme Court has itself relied on legisla-
tive history for the very purpose of determining legislative intent in statutory construc-
tion. (at 109). In the end, the Supreme Court decides to leave the issue undetermined.
54. There are some notable exceptions which we discuss below.
55. [1945] O.W.N. 799 (Co. Ct.) [hereinafter Cavell].
56. However, the decision is somewhat obscure. It distinguishes, without explanation, be-
Successor Landlords
When the Court speaks of "payment in advance" it seems to be referring to the
payment of rent by agreement of the parties on the first of the month for the
current month. It is unfortunate for clarity's sake that the Court then speaks of
"payment of rent ... before it is due". It seems from the context that this must
refer to "prepaid rent" and not "advance rent". There does not seem to be any
reason why the one should be at the tenant's risk and the other not. 57
Re Dollar Land Corporation Ltd. and Soloman5 8 was given special consider-
ation by the OLRC in its first report and the amendments were intended to render
this decision inapplicable to residential tenancies. 59 This decision held that a
deposit on account of rent and other obligations of the tenant was personal in
nature between the immediate landlord and tenant. The court stated that cove-
nants could only bind assignees of the landlord if they touched the rented
premises in the sense of affecting the landlord and tenant relationship. The court
in Re Dollar6° reviewed ancient English case law concerning covenants. In
particular, the case of The Mayor & Corporation of Congleton v. Pattison6 1 held
that a covenant would bind an assignee if it "affected the nature, quality or value
of the thing demised, independently of collateral circumstances...".
The court in Re Dollar concluded that these were collateral circumstances.
Further, the lease referred to "the lessor herein". 62 Even though "landlord"
included "assigns", the lease indicated an intention to confine the application of
the covenant to the immediate parties. I would suggest that this case, even if
tween rent "prepaid" and rent "paid in advance". It then talks of rent "paid before it is
due" without clarification as to which of the two situations it is referring.
57. Presumably, "advance rent" is not at the tenant's risk because it would be by agreement
in the lease and a prospective purchaser should be put on guard. Where a security de-
posit requirement is also contained in a lease, then certainly the prospective purchaser
should be on the same notice. For this reason, we suggest that when the Court speaks of
prepaid rent here, it is referring to situations where the tenant prepays the rent on his or
her own initiative and not by agreement of the parties. This is supported by the decision
in Re Boyd, supra, note 10.
58. Supra, note 19.
59. Unfortunately, the courts have neglected to consider the issue of legislative history or
intention in enacting Part IV of the LTA.
60. Supra, note 19 at 273.
61. (1808), 10 East 130 at 135.
62. The court found this particularly relevant. While Re Dollar, supra, note 19, may have
been correct because of the wording of the lease restricting the interpretation of the term
"landlord" to the "landlord herein", s.80 prohibits any contracting out of the provisions
of Part IV. The term "landlord" for the purpose of Part IV cannot be limited in the man-
ner it was by the lease in Re Dollar, supra.
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correct at the time, has been rendered inapplicable by the landlord and tenant
residential tenancy amendments.
A decision which is frequently relied upon by judges to support the continuation
of the old law under Part IV is Chiappino v. Bishop.63 This decision, in a terse
judgment, applies the outdated reasoning of the above two decisions. The Court
held that there was no basis in law for finding that a successor landlord should
have to credit a tenant for a security deposit paid to a previous landlord when
the deposit was not paid over to the new landlord. 64 This interpretation flies in
the face of the remedial nature of the legislation. It also ignores the very type of
hardship to tenants with respect to security deposits that the OLRC hoped to
address in the new legislation.
Recently, the decision in Chiappino v. Bishop was expressly disapproved of by
the Ontario Court (General Division) in Re Spencer Properties Ltd. and
Zrebiec.6 5 It was also recently distinguished 66 in Re Royal Trust Corp. and
Roche.
6 7
Re Spencer Properties Ltd. and Zrebiec6 8 involved a purchaser of the premises
from a mortgagee under a power of sale. The Court held that the present landlord
should have satisfied itself as to the existence of rent deposits before it purchased
the premises. The principle of caveat emptor was applied to this situation.
69
63. (1988), 49 R.P.R. 218 (Ont. Dist. Ct.).
64. The judge, Matlow J., goes so far as to effectively state that the law had not changed
since the decision in Re Dollar, supra, note 19. (at 219). Re Dollar, supra, including the
ancient cases considered by that court, was the only case considered by this 1988 judg-
ment. The result of the decision was that the tenant had to pay rent for the last month of
the tenancy a second time.
65. Supra, note 38. The Court held that the old law as stated in Cavell, supra note 55, and
in Re Dollar, supra, note 19, has no application to the statutory scheme under Part IV.
These cases did not deal with a situation where there was a statutory obligation con-
cerning rent deposits.
66. On nebulous grounds more indicative of disagreement with that decision.
67. [ 1994] O.J. No. 2462 (O.C.J.) [unreported]. Re Royal Trust Corp. and Roche involved a
mortgagee who had gone into possession. The tenant was in arrears and the mortgagee
brought an application for arrears and termination of the tenancy. The issue in the deci-
sion was whether the mortgagee/landlord had to account for a deposit of $2500 which
had been paid to the mortgagor/landlord. It seems that the deposit in this case was for
more than one month's rent although the reasons do not address that point.
68. Supra, note 38.
69. I suggest that this decision fully examines the issues and correctly evaluates the as-
sumption of risk by a purchaser of residential rental property.
Successor Landlords
On the other hand, in Re Max Diamond and Jukie70 the Court reached a similar
result as in Chiappino v. Bishop. However this case did not deal with a prepaid
security deposit under Part IV. The tenant had paid the previous landlord the
equivalent of 6 months' rent. The mortgagee subsequently took possession and
demanded rent for the same period. The Court, at the urging of the appli-
cant/mortgagee, felt constrained to rely on Danforth Discount Ltd. v. Humphrey
Motors Ltd.7 1 and the decision of DeNichols v. Saunders.72 Like the decisions
in Cavell 73 and Re Dollar,7 4 these pre-Part IV cases stand for the proposition
that where rent is pre-paid to a previous landlord, the successor landlord is not
bound.
75
Although this section refers to security deposits only on sale of the property it
does appear to recognize that mortgagees are liable to credit tenants with
security deposits paid pursuant to s.82 of the LTA. Where the premises is not
sold, s.27 does not apply and tenants are not subject to the priority list. I suggest
that s.27 MA does not affect the legal effect of s.82 of the LTA on successor
landlords who are mortgagees in possession. On the contrary, the amendment
supports a conclusion that successor landlords are bound by s.82 of the LTA.
The amendment does not give greater rights to tenants in mortgagee situations.
I suggest the purpose of the amendment was to restrict the rights of those tenants
with respect to security deposits in the limited context of s.27 of the MA.
Repairs - Abatement
As mentioned above, a major concern of the OLRC in its Interim Report76 was
the responsibility for maintenance and repairs with respect to residential prem-
70. (6 July 1992), #92-LT-36468 (O.C.J.) [hereinafter Re Max Diamond].
71. [1965] 20 O.R. 765 (C.A.). Danforth Discount was a commercial tenancy case. More-
over, it was prior to the extensive law reform in the late 1960's.
72. (1870), LR 5CP 589.
73. Supra, note 55.
74. Supra, note 19.
75. The tenant in Re Max Diamond, supra, note 70, was unrepresented and did not argue
against these out-dated precedents. The tenant was liable to pay the rent. The judge ac-
curately noted that for this tenant on social assistance it was a "most unfortunate situa-
tion". We would suggest that it was not only unfortunate, it was inequitable. It appears
directly contrary to the whole scheme of residential tenancy reform that has taken place
since 1965. Moreover, this was a mortgagee in possession situation. The Court made no ref-
erence to s.27 of the Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40, as am. [hereinafter MA]. Section
27 provides that money from the sale of a property by a mortgagee shall be applied toward
certain purposes in priority. One of these applications is towards security deposits.
76. Supra, note 3. The OLRC reported to the Attorney General for Ontario that the urgency
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Historically, the law of landlord and tenant was developed in an agricultural
setting based on extended tenancies. The justification for relieving the land-
lord from liability for harm sustained by the tenant and his guests and from
an implied obligation to repair had at least an arguable validity. The growth
of modem cities and the inevitable changes it has wrought in the way peo-
ple order their lives requires a re-evaluation of the efficacy of the traditional
common law rules regarding fitness and repair.
It is an economic fact that the modem residential tenant is less likely to be
able to bear the cost of undertaking repairs. In the typical urban apartment
tenancy, which is usually of quite a short duration, the landlord is generally
considered to be the person having the major interest in the condition of the
leased premises. It is the landlord who receives not only the rent, but also
the benefit which results from improvements to the property, including re-
pairs. It is the landlord, therefore, who ought to bear the primary responsi-
bility to repair. He should be required to provide premises which are fit for
human habitation and are in a good state of repair and he should be primar-
ily responsible for keeping them in that condition.
While it seems that the courts may be preparing to cast off the old restrictive
land law concepts with respect to security deposits, the courts have a very
difficult time accepting that a successor landlord should be liable for disrepair
of the problems in the area of residential tenancies required priority treatment. In partic-
ular, the problem of repairs was the source of much concern. (at 35).
85. Ibid. at 35. The OLRC pointed out the following:
one of the consequences of the law as it then existed was that the landlord was not "re-
sponsible for damages suffered by the tenant because of the defective condition of the
premises", (at 36);
the "protection of vital human interests are not recognized" by the existing law and the
"existing arbitrary legal rules must yield to a re-examination of the law, based upon a
realistic assessment of values and needs", (at 42);
the physical and psychological effects of housing which is below reasonable standards
of fitness have become increasingly well known, (at 42);
the landlord is the principal beneficiary, through his/her property interest, of repairs ef-
fected, (at 42); and
the landlord and tenant relationship is not one where tenants have a real freedom to
contract, (at 43).
Successor Landlords
that had accrued under previous ownership.7 8 Re Spencer Properties Ltd. and
Zrebiec.79 was distinguished in Re 981673 Ontario Ltd. and Jessome80 Jessome
dealt with the liability of a mortgagee in possession to account for an entitlement
to an abatement of rent which had accrued under the mortgagor as landlord. The
court held that the mortgagee was only liable from the date it went into
possession. Cases dealing with security deposits were distinguishable in the eyes
of that court.81
Surely s.94 obligations 82 form a material covenant and run with the land under
s.88 of the LTA. 83 There can be no doubt that these obligations are "related to
the rented premises". 84 Certainly with respect to a purchaser, the principle of
caveat emptor, as applied in Re Spencer Properties Ltd. and Zrebiec
8 5 is
applicable. In the case of successor landlords who are mortgagees in possession,
the mortgagee should be liable for the disrepair due to its failure to protect its
investment in the property. 86
CONCLUSION
Part IV of the LTA is a dramatic departure from the common law of landlord and
tenant. Courts still seem to have a very difficult time understanding that. The
remedial nature of the legislation is critical to an understanding and interpreta-
tion of the legislative provisions regarding residential tenancies.
One must ask whether an agreement concerning a security deposit is one that
should bind a successor landlord. Often security deposits are addressed in a
written tenancy agreement. Frequently, however, they are not. The third report
of the OLRC addressed the issue of written and parol tenancy agreements. The
78. However, it is generally accepted that a successor landlord has the obligation to repair
and maintain premises from the date of ownership despite the fact that the disrepair was
the fault of a previous owner.
79. Supra, note 38.
80. (1994), 21 O.R. (3d) 343 (O.C.J.).
81. No reasons were given for that finding.
82. The obligation of a landlord to repair and maintain residential premises.
83. See for example, Re Offredi and 75168 Ontario Ltd. (1994), 72 O.A.C. 235 (Div. Ct.)
aff'g (1991), 27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1051 (O.C.J.) [unreported] and Temlas Apartments Inc.
v. Desloges (1983), 29 O.R. (2d) 30 (Div. Ct.).
84. LTA, s.88.
85. Supra, note 38.
86. Most mortgages give the mortgagee the right to re-entry if the mortgagor is not taking
proper care of the investment.
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third report has no impact on the interpretation of Part IV of the LTA, s.82 since
no amendments to that Part or that section arose from the report. It is, neverthe-
less, informative.
Certainly where the security deposit is expressly addressed in a written tenancy
agreement there is no justification for not holding a successor bound to account
for the deposit. It is not so simple in oral or implied tenancies. However, the
OLRC found that where a covenant was implied by common law or by statute,
it should also be binding on the successor in title.
A security deposit in a non-written tenancy agreement is not directly implied
into the agreement. Certainly, however, the statute provides strong signposts to
would-be-successors in title that such a covenant may exist. The statute puts
them on guard. The remedy for a successor in title who has been misled by a
vendor is to sue the vendor. Where the error is that of the successor in title's
solicitors, then the solicitors may be sued.87 There is no good reason why the
tenant should be the party who assumes the risk.
The security deposit provision was remedial in nature. The deposit provision is
permissive but it is strictly limited. It is not collateral for the performance of a
future obligation. 88 Rather, where taken, it "shall be applied" as rent for the last
month of the tenancy whether terminated at the end of term or earlier.
Therefore, the statute is mandatory with respect to the application of the deposit
once taken by the landlord. The statute cannot predict that the landlord who takes
a deposit will be the same one at that indefinite future date when the mandatory
part of the provision kicks in. If it "shall be applied" then it is only logical that
the landlord at that future date is the one who shall apply it. Similarly, it makes
practical sense that it should be the landlord at that future date who must account
for the deposit if it is to be returned to the tenant.
A legal security deposit under Part IV is the prepayment of rent. Rent is certainly
something which touches the land or the subject matter of the tenancy agree-
ment. The taking of this deposit is expressly provided for in the remedial
legislation. One must presume the legislature did not intend to expose tenants
to the risk of having to pay rent twice for the same period since the amendment
was intended to relieve the hardship of deposits requested by landlords.
Indeed, prior to the enactment of Part IV, the OLRC expressed in its Interim
Report that it should be incumbent on landlords to satisfy themselves on closing
as to the state of deposits. Further, the OLRC expressly stated that the result in
87. Siket v. Milczek, [1993] O.J. No. 3161 (O.C.J.) [unreported].
88. Re Boyd, supra, note 10.
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Re Dollar Land Corporation Ltd. and Soloman was to be avoided. It is reason-
able to presume that the legislature took these considerations into account when
it enacted Part IV.
Moreover, the definition of "landlord" is very broad. It expressly includes
"assignees". Therfore, where it makes sense, the term "landlord" should be read
to include an assignee of the original landlord. For example, the Court of Appeal
read the term "tenant" to include a "subtenant" in Re Baker and Hayward.
89 It
did so because this was consistent with the remedial purpose of the legislation.
Section 88 also states expressly that all covenants relating to the rented premises
run with the land. Such covenants are binding on successors in title. 90
Perhaps the courts' failure to appreciate the scope of the LTA amendments is
understandable. Landlord and tenant applications are intended to be summary in
nature. The parties are frequently unrepresented. If they are represented, their agents
or lawyers frequently have not had the luxury to do extensive research concerning
the legislative history or case law. The court is often unfamiliar with or unsympa-
thetic to residential tenancy principles. The result is, unfortunately, bad law.
I suggest that there can be no doubt that a security deposit, where given, forms
a covenant. This covenant runs with the land and is binding on successor
landlords. This can be the only legitimate conclusion from a thorough91 but plain
reading of the statute. 92 Moreover, if a court were to give due consideration to
the purpose and intent of the amendments and the legislative history behind the
changes, I suggest it cannot judicially reach any other conclusion. 93
Finally, no court has been directed to look at s.62 of the LTA in considering the
issue of security deposits or pre-paid rent generally. This section is not contained
89. Supra, note 8.
90. Spencer's Case, (1583) 5 Co. Rep. 16a.
91. Too often, from reading decisions in landlord and tenant proceedings, one can only
conclude the court has not taken the time to read the statute or the provisions in ques-
tion. This is all the more troubling when so many of the parties, whether landlords or
tenants, are unsophisticated and unrepresented. For example, the courts will frequently,
and all too glibly, state that Part IV is an "exhaustive code of procedure". It takes a sim-
ple reading of Part IV to determine that it is anything but exhaustive. There is not one
procedural provision pertaining to applications under s.94 or s.89 or the LTA. There are
no court forms provided in the LTA or the regulations pertaining to these applications.
While s.113 applications do have minimal procedural provisions pertaining to them,
and are provided with court forms, I doubt there is one serious practitioner who would
state that these provisions are exhaustive.
92. Especially s. 1, "landlord"; see also: s. 62, s.82, and s.88.
93. Re Spencer Properties, supra, note 38.
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in Part IV of the LTA and so the remedial arguments and arguments concerning
the inapplicability of the older case law do not apply to the same degree. 94
However, with the enactment of Part IV, security deposits are no longer collat-
eral agreements. These are now the prepayment of rent and expressly governed
by s.62. While s.62 itself is not new, its application to security deposits for last
month's rent has changed because of the enactment of the Part IV provisions
respecting such deposits.
For all of the above reasons, independently and collectively, I suggest that
holding the tenant liable to a successor landlord for pre-paid rent and especially
for pre-paid rent by way of a last month's rent security deposit, is simply not a
sustainable result. I would apply the same rationale to the issue of accrued
abatements.
94. IA, supra, note 44. Section 10 is still applicable.
